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The Tragedy of the Commons refers to the dissipation of a common-
pool ressource when any appropriator has free access to it. Under the
behavior of absolute payoﬀ maximisation, the common-pool resource
game leads to a Nash equilibrium in which the resource is overexploited.
However, some empirical studies show that the overutilization is even
larger than the Nash equilibrium predicts. We account for these results
in an evolutionary framework. Under an imitation-experimentation
dynamics, the long run stable behavior implies a larger exploitation of
the resource than in the classical Nash equilibrium.
keywords: common-pool resource, imitation behavior, evolutionary
stable strategy, evolutionary games.
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1 introduction
In ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Hardin (1968) raises the problem of ex-
ploitation of the common resources, like water, forests, oil ﬁelds, pastures
and many others. If several appropriators have free access to a common-
pool resource (CPR), then the resource is overexploited because agents do
not consider the degradation of the resource when they appropriate it. The
classical income maximizing Nash equilibrium is consistent with this phe-
nomena. When the number of players is unlimited, the common resource
is dissipated to the level where the average value of extraction equals the
cost of the individual eﬀort. As a result, the exploitation of the resource is
higher than in a pareto-optimal equilibrium. Thus, every situations corre-
sponding to a Tragedy of the Commons seem to be explained by the absolute
maximization behavior adopted by fully rational agents.
∗I thank Gisle Umbhauer and Paul Pezanis-Christou for helpful comments and sugges-
tions.
1However, some laboratory experiments show that the common-pool re-
source is dissipated more than the Nash equilibrium predicts1 . And empiri-
cal evidences like the dramatic deforestation of the amazonian forest suggest
that the degradation sometimes exeeds the Nash equilibrium, as pointed out
by Ito, Saijo and Une (1995). We demonstrate here that these facts are con-
sistent with an evolutionary approach in which a limited number of agents
adopt an imitation and experimentation behavior. Although most of the
recent evolutionary analysis attempt to prove the existence of cooperation
and altruism in games2, our aim is conversly to study the competition re-
sulting from the imitation behavior. This kind of competition is interesting
because it can explain the situations where the dissipation exeeds the Nash
equilibrium.
Why should we study the imitation behavior? Do the economic agents
really imitate each other? Several empirical and theoretical studies proved
that imitation is widely used by economic agents. It is often the best way
to learn and optimize under imperfect information and uncertainty (Pingle
and Day 1996). That’s why there is a place for the imitation behavior and
it is not absurd to assume that imitation could exist in a CPR game.
Vega-Redondo (1997) analysed a ﬁnite n-number Cournot Oligopoly
where ﬁrms imitate those who earn the higher proﬁt in the earlier period.
The result is a convergence toward the walrasian outcome, instead of the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The imitation dynamics describes a logic of rel-
ative proﬁt maximization, leading to the perfect competition equilibrium.
This competitive behavior has been extended to the class of submodular
and quasisubmodular games (Schipper 2004, Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania 2005,
Leininger 2006), which include the CPR game. We use a framework close to
Hehenkamp et al. (2004) to show that the dissipation of a common resource
is higher under the imitation-experimentation dynamics than in the classic
Nash equilibrium (proposition 4).
2 The common-pool resource game
A common-pool resource game is a tuple Γ = (n,Sn,π) where n ≥ 2 is the
number of players, S ∈ R+ is the strategy set common to all players, and π
the payoﬀ function. Each player chooses a level of eﬀort (input) si ∈ Sn in
order to extract the resource. S =
Pn
i=1 si is the sum of all the individual
eﬀorts. The extraction process is represented by a production function facing
decreasing returns to scale Y = f(S) = Sθ with θ ∈]0,1[. Each player
recieves a part of the total output y in proportion of his individual eﬀort.
1See Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994), chapters 5 and 6.
2Cooperation in the CPR game has been studied by Sethi and Somanathan (1996),
Noailly et al. (2007).
2We assume the game to be symmetric, then the payoﬀ of agent i is given





where c > 0 is the cost of the individual eﬀort, for example the wage
rate. The individual payoﬀ depends both on the player’s strategy and the
aggregate of all strategies chosen. Assume that all players adopt the follow-
ing imitation and experimentation behavioral principles. For each discrete
time period t, they imitate with probability 1−ǫ the strategy that gave the
highest payoﬀ in the earlier period among all the participants. With a small
probability ǫ > 0, they try a new strategy randomly choosen in the strategy
set Sn. Note that this behavior does not require any knowledge about the
payoﬀ function. An agent only needs to know the individual strategy si of
all the participants and their associated payoﬀs for the previous period.
3 Evolutionary stability
The main purpose in evolutionary games is to describe the long run behavior
adopted by players. This is generally done by using the concept of evolu-
tionary stable strategy (ESS). Here we deﬁne the ESS in the case of a ﬁnite
population, and we show that it corresponds to the unique globally stable
ESS, which is the long run behavior under the imitation-experimentation
dynamics.
3.1 Evolutionary stable behavior
Maynard Smith (1982) deﬁned the concept of an evolutionary stable strategy
to characterize the long run equilibrium in evolutionary games. A strategy
is said to be evolutionary stable if a population using this strategy cannot
be invaded by a small group of mutants using another strategy. In other
words, there exist an invasion barrier such that the ESS yields higher payoﬀs
than the other strategies.
The Maynard Smith formal deﬁnition of an ESS holds for pairwise con-
tests where two players are repeatedly chosen at random in an inﬁnite pop-
ulation. But in many economic situations, including the common-pool ex-
traction game, it is more realistic to assume that players take part simulta-
neously to the game and that the number of players, even large, is limited.
Schaﬀer (1988) precisely adapted the notion of ESS to a ﬁnite population of
agents who compete simultaneously.
Deﬁnition 1. (1-stable ESS) Let Γ = (n,Sn,π) be a symmetric game.
The strategy s∗ is a (strictly) 1-stable3 ESS if ∀s ∈ Sn and s  = s∗,
3Who resists to the appearance of one mutant at a time
3π(s∗|s,s∗,...,s∗) ≥ (>) π(s|s∗,...,s∗).
This deﬁnition means that in a 1-stable ESS, a single mutant always
performs badly compared with the other players. We now determine the
ESS of the CPR game in the next proposition.




Proof. The deﬁnition of an ESS means that
s∗ ∈ arg max
s [π1(s|s∗,...,s∗) − πj(s∗|s,s∗,...,s∗)], j = 2,...,n.
If s∗ is the candidate strategy for an ESS and s is the mutant strategy,
π1(s|s∗,...,s∗) − πj(s∗|s,s∗,...,s∗) =
s − s∗
s + (n − 1)s∗(s + (n − 1)s∗)θ
−c(s − s∗)
= (s − s∗)(s + (n − 1)s∗)θ−1
−c(s − s∗)
the ﬁrst order condition is given by
(s + (n − 1)s∗)θ−1 + θ(s − s∗)(s + (n − 1)s∗)θ−2 = c










The 1-stable ESS s∗ resists to the appearance of one mutant at a time.
If we allow the mutants to appear in groups of any size m ∈ [1,n − 1], we
must deﬁne an ESS as a globally stable ESS, like in the following deﬁnition.
4A state is said to be monomorphic when all agents play the same strategy.
4Deﬁnition 2. (Globally Stable ESS) Let Γ = (n,Sn,π) be a symmetric
game. The strategy s∗ is a (strictly) globally stable ESS if ∀s ∈ Sn and
s  = s∗,
π(s∗|s,...,s | {z }
m
,s∗,...,s∗) ≥ (>) π(s|s,...,s | {z }
m−1
,s∗,...,s∗) ∀ 1 ≤ m ≤ n−1.
We show now that the 1-stable ESS s∗ = c
1
θ−1/n is globally stable.
Resistance to one mutant implies resistance to m mutants in the CPR game.
Proposition 2. Stability against invadibility by one mutant implies stability
against any number of mutants. Then the ESS s∗ = c
1
θ−1/n is globally stable.
Proof. We use the same method than Hehenkamp et al. (2004). Write πm
s
the relative payoﬀ of a mutant in respect to the ESS when the population
contains m mutants.
πm
s = (s − s∗)[ms + (n − m)s∗]θ−1 − c(s − s∗) ∀s  = s∗
Note that since s∗ is an ESS, the relative proﬁt of a single mutant is
negative, π1
s < 0.




= (s − s∗)2(θ − 1)[ms + (n − m)s∗]θ−2 < 0
This expression is negative because (θ−1) is negative and the two others
terms in brackets are positive. Hence the inﬂuence of m is always negative. A
group of m mutants is penalised by an additional mutant for all m ∈ [1,n−1].
Then stability against one mutant involves stability against any invasion by
m mutants 5.
3.2 Stochastic stability
A globally stable ESS is the long run equilibrium of an evolutionary game if
it is the unique stochastically stable state. Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania (2005) use
results of Ellison (2000) to show that a globally stable ESS is eﬀectively the
unique stochastically stable state of a learning process based on imitation
and experimentation behavior.
5This property applies more generally to symmetric aggregative games (Al´ os-Ferrer
and Ania 2005, Leininger 2006)
5Proposition 3. Let s∗ be a globally stable ESS. The proﬁle w∗ = (s∗,...,s∗)
is the unique stochastically stable state of the imitation-experimentation dy-
namics. Then, in the CPR game all players adopt the behavior s∗ = c
1
θ−1/n
in the long run.
Proof. cf Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania (proposition 4)
4 Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium
In the classical form of the game where players maximize their absolute
proﬁt, the individual optimal strategy corresponds to a Nash equilibrium.
It is well known that this behavior leads to an overutilization of the common
resource. We show in the next proposition that the situation is worse in our
evolutionary framework.
Proposition 4. The optimal input eﬀort is higher in the globally stable
ESS than in the Nash equilibrium, which is itself higher than the pareto
optimum. S∗ > SN > SP for all n ≥ 2 players and for any cost level
c > 0. Then, the resource is overexploited in a larger mesure under the logic
of relative optimization than in the absolute maximization standard game,
Y ∗ > Y N > Y P.
Proof. First, we show that the aggregate eﬀort level is higher in the Nash
equilibrium than under the pareto-optimal exploitation, SN > SP. The
pareto optimal condition is given by









SP is the aggregate eﬀort which maximises the sum of the individual








SN f′(SN) − c = 0






∂sN = (n − 1)
f(SN)
SN + f′(SN) − nc = 0
(n − 1)
f(SN)
SN + f′(SN) = nc
We substitute f(S) by Sθ
(n − 1)(SN)θ−1 + θ(SN)θ−1 = cn




n − 1 + θ
￿ 1
θ−1


















θn < n − 1 + θ
θ < 1
which is true because of the decreasing returns to scale of the production
function. So SN > SP is the classical result that Nash equilibrium leads to
the overexploitation of the resource.
Secondly. Recall that the ESS is S∗ = c1/(θ−1).



















n − 1 + θ
7θ < 1
which, as before, is true because of the decreasing returns to scale. Then
S∗ > SN, the aggregate eﬀort is higher in the evolutionary stable equilibrium
than in the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we have S∗ > SN > SP. And since









Figure 1 : Pareto-eﬃcient, Nash equilibrium and ESS exploitation
In the standard Nash equilibrium, the resource can be dissipated at most
to the level where the average value of extraction equals the individual cost
of eﬀort. This situation generates a lower proﬁt than the beneﬁt obtained
under pareto optimality, but the proﬁt is still positive. Under the logic of
relative maximization, players increase their eﬀorts until the average product




= s∗(S∗θ−1 − c)
= s∗(c − c)
= 0
The agents increase their eﬀorts until all opportunities of proﬁt disap-
pear. This result is similar to Vega-Redondo’s Cournot oligopoly (1997).
Under imitation and experimentation, the long run outcome of the Cournot
oligopoly is the competitive equilibrium where proﬁts equal zero.
8Another interesting feature is that the Nash equilibrium approaches the
ﬁnite population ESS when the number of players becomes large. If the
population size grows up, lim
n→∞
n
n−1+θ = 1 and then lim
n→∞SN = S∗. So when
many rational players have free access to the ressource, the exploitation level
approaches the ﬁnite population ESS.
5 Resource stock
What happens when we take into consideration the stock level of the re-
source? Noally et al. (2007) introduce the stock level K in the production
function, which gives
Yk = f(S,K) = SθK1−θ
We can compute the new Nash equilibrium
(n − 1)Sθ−1K1−θ + θSθ−1K1−θ = nc
Sθ−1K1−θ =
nc























We see that the eﬀort is proportional to K in the three equilibrium
concepts. Hence the result of the previous section holds when we introduce
the stock level K.
6 conclusion
We have shown that the dissipation of a common resource is higher in an
imitation-experimentation dynamics than in the classical Nash equilibrium.
The Tragedy of the Commons is then attested in our evolutionary frame-
work. The degradation of the resource is worse with imitators than with fully
rational agents. The competition for capturing a common resource is tough
9because of the imitation behavior implying a logic of relative optimization.
Agents are willing to grab more of the resource in order to maximize the
diﬀerence between their own payoﬀs and the payoﬀs of the other players,
until their proﬁts equal zero.
Although many of evolutionary games treats about the emergence and
the stability of cooperation and altruism, we should not forget that compe-
tition is at least important and is not the privilege of the non-evolutionary
theory. A concrete example of ﬁerce competition in common-pool resource
is given by the rapid deforestation in South America. This ‘Tragedy’ could
be explained by the evolutionary process based on the imitation behavior.
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